Encrypted Traffic
SSL/TLS & SSH Decryption 06
Learning objectives
- Explain why decryption is required for App-ID, Content-ID, and Threat Prevention to be effective against HTTPS/SSH traffic
- Distinguish SSL Forward Proxy, SSL Inbound Inspection, and SSH Proxy by direction of traffic and certificate requirements
- Identify why HA does not preserve decrypted sessions across a failover
Most traffic today is encrypted, and "you can't block what you don't inspect." Decryption lets the NGFW briefly turn ciphertext back into plaintext, inspect it, then re-encrypt it before it leaves the box.
Why
Attackers hide malware delivery and C2 inside HTTPS; without decryption, App-ID/Content-ID/Threat Prevention are effectively blind to most modern traffic.How
Three modes: SSL Forward Proxy — for outbound traffic, the firewall acts as a man-in-the-middle proxy, presenting a certificate signed by an internal/enterprise CA trusted by client endpoints. SSL Inbound Inspection — for traffic to your own servers, the firewall holds the server's actual private key so it can decrypt without re-signing. SSH Proxy — decrypts SSH sessions to police tunneling, no certificates needed. All three re-encrypt traffic before forwarding. Decryption is policy-based (decryption policy rules + profiles), so you can exempt categories like finance/healthcare sites for legal reasons.Pros
- Only way to make Threat Prevention, Advanced URL Filtering, and file inspection actually see HTTPS content
- Supports Perfect Forward Secrecy (DHE/ECDHE) and HSM-backed private keys
- Selective decryption by URL category/risk lets you balance privacy vs. inspection
Cons
- CPU/resource intensive — decrypting everything indiscriminately can be a major performance hit
- Legal/regulatory limits in some jurisdictions and for some traffic types (banking, healthcare)
- Certificate trust must be deployed to every endpoint or users get browser warnings
- HA does not sync decrypted sessions — a failover drops and restarts those sessions under the new node's policy
- Pinned-certificate apps can break under forward proxy
Exam Trap
Candidates often assume decryption is "set it and forget it." In reality decryption policy is evaluated separately from Security policy (much like NAT), exemptions must be maintained for legally-restricted categories, and — critically — an HA failover does not preserve decrypted session state, so those sessions restart under the new active node's policy rather than continuing transparently.
Self-check: SSL/TLS & SSH Decryption
Source: pan-os/11-1/pan-os-admin/decryption/decryption-overview
Certificate Management 07
Learning objectives
- Describe what the forward-trust CA certificate does and why it should chain to an enterprise root CA
- Explain the operational risk of expired certificates or missing OCSP/CRL checks
- Identify which firewall functions depend on certificate trust chains (decryption, GlobalProtect, Authentication Portal, admin/API access)
Centralized handling of the keys and certificates that secure decryption, GlobalProtect, the Authentication Portal, and admin/API access, across their full lifecycle.
Why
Decryption, VPN, and admin access all depend on trust chains; an expired or mismanaged certificate silently breaks decryption or locks out VPN users.How
One admin interface to generate/import certs, add CAs, configure OCSP responders, and set certificate checks. For outbound decryption the firewall auto-generates a copy of the destination's cert, signed by its own forward-trust CA certificate (ideally chained to your enterprise root CA so endpoints trust it silently).Pros
- Single pane for cert lifecycle across decryption, VPN, and admin auth
- Chaining the forward-trust CA to an enterprise root avoids per-endpoint trust errors
- Supports HSM integration for protecting private keys
Cons
- Mismanagement (expired certs, missing CRL/OCSP checks) causes major outages, not just warnings
- Deploying trusted forward-proxy CA certs to every managed and unmanaged endpoint is an ongoing operational burden
Exam Trap
Don't confuse the forward-trust CA certificate (used to sign the firewall's substitute certs during SSL Forward Proxy) with the certificate presented during SSL Inbound Inspection — inbound inspection uses the real server's own key/cert, no forward-trust CA involved. Also remember: if the forward-trust CA isn't chained to (or imported as) a trusted root on client endpoints, every decrypted site throws a browser trust warning even though decryption itself is working correctly.
Self-check: Certificate Management
Source: ngfw/administration/certificate-management
Module Quiz
1. An engineer needs to decrypt and inspect inbound traffic to an internally-hosted web server, without the firewall substituting its own certificate to clients. Which decryption mode should be configured?
2. A user's outbound HTTPS session to an external site is decrypted via SSL Forward Proxy. What certificate does the client's browser actually see presented?
3. After enabling SSL Forward Proxy decryption, a mobile banking app on employee devices begins failing to connect while browser traffic decrypts normally. What is the most likely explanation?
4. An HA active/passive pair is running SSL Forward Proxy decryption on production traffic. An HA failover event occurs. What happens to sessions that were actively decrypted on the formerly-active node?
5. Which of the three primary decryption modes requires no certificates at all to operate?
6. Which cryptographic capability does the firewall support specifically to preserve forward secrecy on sessions it re-encrypts after decryption?
7. Why is a forward-trust CA certificate typically chained to an existing enterprise root CA rather than deployed as a standalone self-signed certificate?
8. A firewall's forward-trust CA certificate silently expires without anyone noticing. What is the most likely resulting symptom reported by users?